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Abstract Committee decision making is examined in this study focusing on the role
assigned to the committee members. In particular, we are concerned about the com-
parison between committee performance under specialization and non-specialization
of the decision makers. Specialization (in the context of project or public policy selec-
tion) means that the decision of each committee member is based on a narrow area,
which typically results in the acquirement and use of relatively high expertise in that
area. When the committee members’ expertise is already determined, specialization
only means that the decision of each committee member is based solely on his/her rel-
atively high expertise area. This form of specialization is potentially inferior relative
to non-specialization under which the decision of each committee member is based on
different areas, not just his/her relatively high expertise area. Given that the expertise
of the committee members is already determined but unknown, our analysis focuses
on non-specializing individuals whose decision is based on a decision rule that does
not require information on the decision-making skills. Under these realistic assump-
tions, non-specialization is shown to be preferable over specialization, depending on
the aggregation rule applied by the committee. The significance of our approach is not
limited to the specific results that we obtain. Rather, it should be viewed as a first step
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toward a deeper examination of the role of individual decision makers in enhancing
the performance of collective decision making.
Keywords Project selection · Public policy · Collective decision making ·
Committee · Uncertain dichotomous choice · Specialization · Simple majority rule
JEL Classification D81 · D71
1 Introduction
Collective decisions are best made by having many people involved in the process
of decision making. Typically, large groups of people (committees) can make better
decisions than a single person. Thus, in private economic organizations, investment
decisions are often made collectively in committees and, in the public sector, project
proposals (e.g., building a new toll road) are often evaluated by teams of experts.
This article proposes a new approach to evaluate and improve the performance of
committee decision making. Our focus is on the decision-making assignments of the
potential decision makers and their particular role both in information gathering and
in actual decision making. In contrast to Sah and Stiglitz (1986), who focused on
the architecture of collective decision making, the placement of the committee mem-
bers in the decision-making system and the comparison between the performance of
a centralized organization (hierarchy) and a decentralized organization (polyarchy),
our distinction between alternative decision-making systems is based on the different
roles assigned to the decision-making units: the committee members.
Typically, a committee must evaluate different aspects of a project proposal (the
project components) that are critical to its success before deciding whether to invest
in the project. In some committees, members may be assigned to assess a particular
aspect of a project (e.g., technical feasibility, market potential) or be called upon to
provide an overall assessment. Partial evaluation that can be justified by resort to a
specialization argument is quite common in making a decision regarding acceptance
or rejection of a complex project. Specialization by members of such committees who
can acquire expertise (skill) is based on the possibility of each committee member
to focus efforts in a narrow area and, in turn, to acquire a relatively high decision-
making skill in that area. Thus, under specialization, the decision regarding the pro-
ject is based on the decisions of the committee members such that each committee
member’s decision on the project is based just on his/her relatively high expertise
area. A final decision to accept or reject is then based on a rule that aggregates the
decision makers’ votes. In most situations, committee members may evaluate, how-
ever, several areas (e.g., financial analysis, knowledge of technology trends, marketing
experience, etc.). Conceptually, a manager may evaluate different components of the
project, come up with different assessments of the likelihood of success of the pro-
ject based on the assessment of different components, and aggregate these different
assessments to come up with an overall assessment of the project. The individual
will arrive at an overall opinion and a vote summarizing his recommendation for the
investment. This recommendation is based on his internal aggregation of his different
123
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Fig. 1 Specialization
opinions that are based on the evaluation of the different components of the project.
In the second stage a final decision to accept or reject is based on a rule that aggre-
gates the decision makers’ votes. Non-specialization therefore means that the decision
regarding the project is based on the already aggregated decisions of the committee
members over all the components of the project. Specialization and non-specialization
in committee decision making are schematically illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2. Notice
that non-specialization is a two-stage procedure.
The comparison between specialization and non-specialization is important to col-
lective decision making in the private as well as in the public sector. We provide two
examples to illustrate the situations that we are concerned about and their relevance to
decision making in the economic realm and to public, legislative, and political decision
making.
The first example concerns the investment in new ideas and startups in the venture
investment industry. It is well-known that specialization in committee decision mak-
ing often takes place in venture capital firms. In some firms, a partner may focus on
just one aspect of the project (e.g., quality of the management team, or the potential
of the technology) or he may assess several aspects of the project. After evaluating
an investment proposal, a partner in the investment committee can form an opinion
on the potential of the overall project. The partner then votes on the project, as any
other member of the investment committee. The committee decides whether to accept
or reject the project, based on the votes of its members and a pre-determined decision
rule.
The second example concerns political decision making in the public sector. Con-
sider the case of a committee of Ministers trying to decide whether to allow casinos
to be built in a country. The policy decision to build casinos would have widespread
consequences for the economy, for many years to come. There are the economic ben-
efits—through the creation of jobs, increase in tourist arrivals, and multiplier effects
filtering to the rest of the economy—as well as potential social costs, through the pos-
sible increase in problem gambling, potential increase in crime, money-laundering,
etc. Since multinational companies will be invited to bid for the casino concessions
with a 30-year lease, a government decision to go ahead cannot be reversed. In the
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committee, each minister is unlikely to be an expert in all the different aspects of the
policy under consideration. The Minister in charge of Industry and Trade may have
a better grasp of the economic impacts, compared with the Home Affairs Minister,
who would have a deeper appreciation of social consequences associated with the
government decision. In such a situation, should the Prime Minister ask each Minister
in the committee to evaluate all aspects of the policy and vote (i.e., as non-specialists,
according to our definition), or to evaluate only one aspect of the policy and vote
(i.e., as a specialist)?
In general, the evaluation of a component of a project or policy alternative allows
a decision maker to infer imperfectly the overall quality of the project or policy under
consideration. Specialization in the evaluation process means that the decision regard-
ing the project or policy is based on skills of those who are the experts in the various
components of the project. In most situations, committee members involved in polit-
ical decision making may possess domain expertise in several areas (e.g., economic
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benefits, social costs, migration issues, environment impact, etc.). Conceptually, a
decision maker may evaluate different components of the policy and come up with
different assessments of the likelihood of success of the policy based on the assessment
of different components, and aggregate these different assessments to come up with
an overall assessment of the policy. Non-specialization therefore means that the deci-
sion regarding the policy is based on the already aggregated skills of the committee
members over all the components of the policy.
In our setting, the decision-making skills of the committee members are already
determined, thus specialization only means that each committee member’s decision
on the project is based just on his/her relatively high expertise area. This weaker form
of specialization is potentially inferior relative to non-specialization under which the
decision of each committee member is based on all relevant areas, not just his/her
relatively high expertise area. Given that committee members’ expertise is already
determined but unknown, the main objective of this article is to examine whether the
common use of specialization can be justified.
The issue on which this article focuses is related to the literature on collective
decision making under uncertainty, which is concerned with the choice of appropriate
organizational aggregation rules to mitigate decision errors that are committed when
decision makers are fallible, Ben-Yashar and Kraus (2002), Ben-Yashar and Nitzan
(1997), Berend and Sapir (2005, 2007), Koh (1992, 1994, 2005), Nitzan and Paroush
(1982), Sah (1991), and Sah and Stiglitz (1985, 1986, 1988), Sapir (1998, 2004). To
date, the literature on the optimal decision rule in collective fallible decision making
has focused on the overall project assessment by decision makers.
In this article, we are interested in the situation where decision makers are able to
assess the quality of the project by evaluating components of the project. Our emphasis
is on the significance of the role assigned to each of the decision makers. We first clar-
ify why, given already acquired decision-making skills, non-specialization is superior
to specialization which is based on less information (partial evaluation of the project),
provided that the aggregation process is optimal (i.e., the decisions of non-specializing
committee members and the collective decisions are optimal). Since the already deter-
mined decision-making skills are usually unknown, optimal decisions are impossible.
In other words, the optimal decisions cannot be made when the decision-making skills,
the parameters that enable the identification of the optimal decision rules, are unknown.
Our main result establishes that under such circumstances, even under homogenous
decision makers, where the decision-making skills for each component are the same
for all the decision makers, the common weaker form of specialization that implies
partial evaluation of the project can be superior to non-specialization. This finding
is based on the assumption that the same decision rule is applied by the committee
under specialization and non-specialization and that the decisions of non-specializing
individuals are based on an internal aggregation rule that does not require information
on their decision-making skills. Under the first extreme case that we study, the deci-
sion of each non-specializing individual is based on the internal aggregation rule that
randomly chooses one component of the project. In this case, specialization is superior
to non-specialization, when the committee applies the simple majority rule. In gen-
eral, specialization is superior to non-specialization when the probability of making
the correct collective decision using a particular aggregation rule by the committee is
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monotonic and satisfies second-order positive monotonicity (i.e., the marginal contri-
bution of decision-making skill is positive and increases with its relative ranking in
terms of decision-making skills), as under the simple majority rule. Under the second
extreme case that we study, the decision of each non-specializing individual is based on
the simple majority internal aggregation rule that equally takes into account all his/her
decisions on the different project components.1 In this case we provide sufficient con-
ditions for the inferiority of specialization. These preliminary findings illustrate the
significance of the role assigned to committee members, beyond the significance of
the architecture of the decision-making system, in determining the performance of the
collective decision-making system.
The article is structured as follows. The framework that enables comparison of
group performance under specialization and non-specialization is presented in Sect. 2.
The superiority of non-specialization over specialization under already determined
committee members’ expertise is discussed in Sect. 3. The comparison between spe-
cialization and non-specialization, given that expertise is already determined, but
unknown, is presented in Sect. 4. Section 5 contains an illustrative example and a
brief summary.
2 The model: specialization versus non-specialization
A committee faces a stream of projects, which may be interpreted broadly to include
investment proposals or policy options facing a government or the legislature. The
committee has to decide whether to accept or reject each project or policy that it
receives (henceforth we use the term project, but our framework is applicable in vari-
ous public, political, and legislative settings). There are two possible types of projects:
(G)ood and (B)ad. A project consists of m components (e.g., technology, market
potential for an investment proposal; social costs and economic benefits for a policy
option) that jointly determine the quality of the project.
Suppose there are n independent decision makers (individuals). Our results are
derived for n = m. For further discussion of this assumption see Sect. 2.3. All the
decision makers share the same purpose, to decide correctly, i.e., to accept a good
project and reject a bad one. Let pi j denote the probability that decision maker i
correctly infers the true quality of the project, conditional on the evaluation of only
the j th component of the project. Hence, we may index decision maker i’s expertise
in reviewing component j by pi j ≥ 12 . These fixed probabilities are assumed to be
given and independent. We represent the organization’s decision-making skills by the
following matrix:
p =
⎛
⎜⎝
p11 . . . p1m
...
. . .
...
pn1 · · · pnm
⎞
⎟⎠ (1)
1 In the neuro-economics literature there is a debate on whether the brain acts as a dual or unitary system
when taking a decision (see Rustichini (2008)). This question can provide a behavioral justification or at
least a preliminary analogy to the two types of internal aggregation rules studied in this article.
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We shall refer to specialized decision making as the case where each decision maker
gives a recommendation to accept or reject the project, based on a partial evaluation
of just one component of the project, such that the decision maker is the expert in
that particular component. Each committee member expresses his opinion regarding
the acceptance of the project by making a ‘Yes’ (1) or ‘No’ (−1) decision. Given the
decisions of the different decision makers, a collective organizational decision, i.e.,
the final decision, to accept or reject the project is then arrived at by the committee
applying an aggregation rule, denoted by f S; f S : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}.
In our study, non-specialized decision making refers to the case where each decision
maker evaluates the entire project (all the components of the project), and then votes
‘Yes’ (1) or ‘No’ (−1) regarding the acceptance of the project, which is based on his
internal aggregation rule. Again, a final decision to accept or reject is based on a rule,
denoted by f NS; f NS : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}, that aggregates the decision makers’
votes. Among other possible monotonic aggregation rules, f S or f NS may refer to
a simple majority rule. Recall that the difference between specialized (S) individual
decision making and non-specialized (NS) individual decision making is due to the
difference in the information used by the individual in the two cases. A specializing
individual makes his decision on the basis of the component in which he is the expert,
whereas a non-specializing individual makes his decision using an internal aggrega-
tion rule that takes into account his possibly different opinions that are based on the
assessment of the different components of the project.
2.1 The collective probability: specialization in decision making
Let p˜i = (pi1, . . . , pim) denote the vector of decision-making skills of deci-
sion maker i . For arbitrarily fixed 1 ≤ k ≤ m, let qk = max1≤l≤n plk and
i = arg max1≤l≤n plk . Then the decision maker i is the expert in component k.
In our decision-making setting, specialization refers to the situation where every
decision maker assesses the quality of a project on the basis of a single component of
the project, such that the decision maker is the expert in that particular component. It is
assumed that each decision maker is the expert in only one of the project components
and the expertise is in different components. The vector of m-element decision-making
expertise is given by
q˜ = (q1, .., qi , .., qm) (2)
For an aggregation rule f S, that is applied in the case of specialization, and a vector of
specialized decision-making skills q˜ , let ( f S, q˜) denote the probability of making
the right decision regarding a project.
2.2 The collective probability: non-specialization in decision making
In this case, each decision maker evaluates all the components of the project and not
only the component in which he is the expert. When a decision maker evaluates the
whole project, he takes on the role of a generalist in arriving at an overall opinion
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regarding the acceptability of the project. Since he has the opportunity to review dif-
ferent project components, he may formulate different opinions regarding the quality
of the project after the evaluation of different components. In the context of political
decision making, a politician tasked to evaluate the policy options may arrive at dif-
ferent views about the quality of a policy proposal based on separate evaluations of
the economic benefits and the social impact. He or she will then formulate an overall
opinion before casting his vote on the issue. Similarly, in the investment context, when
a partner in the investment committee of a venture capital firm assesses the different
aspects of a start-up (e.g., technology sophistication, market potential, management
team, etc.), he may arrive at different opinions regarding the prospects of the company
based on the evaluation of different aspects. Finally, he will arrive at an overall opinion
and a vote summarizing his recommendation for the investment. This recommenda-
tion is based on his internal aggregation of his different opinions that are based on the
evaluation of the different components of the project.
The internal aggregation rules play an important role by determining z˜, the vector
of the overall decision-making expertise of the n decision makers:
z˜ = (z1, . . . , zn) (3)
where zi = ( f, p˜i ) denotes the probability that individual i with vector skills p˜i
would make the right decision using the internal decision rule f .
For an aggregation rule f NS, which is applied in the case of non-specialization, and
a vector of overall decision-making expertise z˜, let ( f NS, z˜) denote the probability
of making the right decision regarding a project, based on the summarized votes of
the decision makers regarding the project.
2.3 Assumptions and some properties of decision rules
We introduce below some simplifying assumptions that enable us to focus on the
comparison between specialization and non-specialization. First, it is assumed that
n = m, i.e., the number of decision makers is equal to the number of components.
When n is not equal to m, the tradeoff between the number of decision makers and
their skills becomes an important issue. While this is an interesting aspect of the deci-
sion problem, we shall not consider it in this article as it distracts attention from our
main focus. Second, it is assumed that the same aggregation (decision) rules are used
whether the evaluation process involves specialization or non-specialization. That is,
f NS = f S. Or, in those cases when these aggregation rules are different, it is assumed
that the optimal (possibly different) aggregation rules are used whether the evalua-
tion process involves specialization or non-specialization. Without this assumption,
the relationship between the different characteristics of the aggregation rules and the
vector of decision-making skills becomes an important issue. Again, this aspect of
the decision problem is not considered here, since it is not the main focus of this
article.
For the analysis in this article, we will consider only monotonic functions.
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A function t (x) is monotonic if :
∀i,1≤i≤n, ∀ε>0
∀i, t (x) − t (x/xi − ε) > 0 where (x/xi − ε) = (x1, . . . , xi − ε, . . . xn).
The function t (x) satisfies second-order positive monotonicity2 if
∀i, j, t (x) − t (x/xi − ε) > t (x) − t (x/x j − ε) ⇔ xi > x j
where ε is a positive number.
The function t (x) satisfies second-order negative monotonicity if
∀i, j, t (x) − t (x/xi − ε) < t (x) − t (x/x j − ε) ⇔ xi > x j
where ε is a positive number.
Let ( f, p˜) denote the probability that the correct decision is made using the rule f ,
where p˜ = (p1, . . . ., pn) is the vector of decision-making skills of the members of
group N . In Lemma 1 (Lemma 2) we relate to the simple majority rule (hierarchy and
polyarchy rules).
Lemma 1 ( fm, p˜) is monotonic and satisfies second-order positive monotonicity,
where fm is the simple majority rule.
Proof See Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000).
Let fh denote the hierarchy rule, i.e., the decision is to accept the project provided
that acceptance is the unanimous decision and fp denote the polyarchy rule where a
single acceptance is sufficient for the decision to accept the project.
Lemma 2 ( fh, p˜) and ( fp, p˜) are monotonic and satisfy second-order negative
monotonicity.
Proof See Appendix.
3 The desirability of non-specialization in decision making
Since the expertise of the committee members is already determined, specialization
only means that the decision of each committee member on the project is based solely
on his/her relatively high expertise area. This weaker form of specialization results in
inferior performance relative to non-specialization that efficiently utilizes the decision-
making skills. Such efficiency is obtained when every non-specializing decision maker
decides optimally, i.e., his decision is based on the optimal decision rule, which takes
into account his skills p˜i and his specific actual decisions regarding the project that
2 In Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000), second-order positive monotonicity is referred to as dimensionally
strict monotonicity.
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are based on the components of the project. Hence, the probability that a non-special-
izing decision maker would reach a correct decision for the project is zi = ( f ∗, p˜i ),
which denotes the probability that he would make the right decision using the optimal
(internal) decision rule f ∗ (such an optimal rule maximizes the probability that the
decision maker makes the correct choice, given his decisions on the various project
components). Clearly, since specialization gives up some useful information, we get:
Proposition 1 If the non-specializing committee members decide optimally, then non-
specialization is preferred to specialization.
Proof Since zi = ( f ∗, p˜i ), it follows that for every decision maker i , it holds that
∀ j, zi ≥ pi j , hence, ∀i, zi ≥ qk . We therefore obtain that z˜ ≥ q˜ .
(1) If f S and f NS are the optimal aggregation rules under specialization and non-
specialization, respectively, we have ( f NS, z˜) ≥ ( f S, z˜).
By the monotonicity of ( f, p˜), z˜ > q˜ implies that ( f S, z˜) ≥ ( f S, q˜).
It follows therefore that ( f NS, z˜) ≥ ( f S, q˜).
(2) If f S and f NS are not the optimal aggregation rules but identical monotonic
aggregation rules, then, since z˜ > q˜ , by the monotonicity of ( f, p˜), it follows
that ( f NS, z˜) ≥ ( f S, q˜).
unionsq
To sum up, non-specialization is the preferred mode for making an overall project
assessment, when the non-specializing individuals decide optimally, provided that
the rules applied by the committee are optimal or that identical rules are used under
specialization and non-specialization.
Generally, determining whether specialization or non-specialization is preferable
depends on the comparison of the probability vectors z˜ and q˜ . Clearly, if one of the
vectors is larger than the other, it is straightforward to determine the superiority of
specialization versus non-specialization or vice versa. As shown above, this is the
case when the non-specializing individuals decide optimally. Non-specialization is
preferable, because the decisions of the non-specializing individuals are based on the
efficient utilization of all the available information (the decision-making skills of the
individuals).3
The situation becomes complex when the non-specializing individuals do not decide
optimally. In such a case, there is no reason to expect that one of the probability vectors
is larger than the other. Hence, the probabilities in the entire matrix have to be consid-
ered and this casts doubt on whether the derivation of general results is an interesting
task.
The non-specializing individuals cannot decide optimally when the decision-
making skills, the parameters that enable the identification of the optimal (internal)
decision rules (the internal aggregation rules applied by non-specializing individuals)
are unknown. The main objective of this article is to examine whether the common
use of specialization in this case can be justified.
3 The above results can be considered as yet another manifestation of the basic inferiority of the expert
rule, the rule that applies just the highest decision-making skill, relative to the optimal rule, which is based
on all the decision-making skills, see Nitzan and Paroush (1982).
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4 Unknown decision-making skills
Even-though in this setting specialization is applied in a weak sense, we show that
it can still be superior to non-specialization, even in the simple case where decision
makers are assumed to be homogeneous, both in their decision-making skills and in
the internal aggregation rule they apply under the non-specialization setting.4 Homo-
geneous decision-making skills imply that pi j = pl j , ∀i, l = 1, . . . , n. That is, the
decision-making skill for each component is the same for all the decision makers.
We therefore denote the (homogenous) expertise to evaluate component j by p j . The
vector of decision-making skills of every individual is denoted by p˜, p˜ = p˜i = p˜ j ,
for every i 
= j . When project evaluation involves specialization, each decision maker
is assigned to one particular component, and it does not matter which decision maker
is assigned to which component. The vector of decision-making skills when project
evaluation is based on such specialization is given by5
q˜ = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) (4)
The vector of decision-making skills under non-specialization is, as before, given by
z˜ = (z1, z2, . . . , zn).
As in the general case (of heterogeneous expertise), if every non-specializing deci-
sion maker decides optimally, non-specialization is preferable to specialization. How-
ever, when decision-making skills are unknown, non-specializing decision makers
cannot identify the optimal internal aggregation rule. We study below two extreme
internal aggregation rules that can be used without any information on decision-
making skills that are unknown. Under the first extreme rule, every non-specializ-
ing committee member decides whether to accept or reject a project on the basis of
only one randomly selected component. For instance, each partner in a venture capital
firm may evaluate a prospective investment by randomly selecting an aspect of the
startup’s business plan to evaluate. In this case, the probability that a decision maker i
reaches a correct decision for the project is given by zi = p¯ = 1m
∑m
j=1 p j (recall that
n = m). Due to the assumption regarding the homogeneity of the internal aggregation
rules, z˜ = ( p¯, p¯, . . . , p¯).
Under the second extreme internal aggregation rule, every non-specializing com-
mittee member decides whether to accept or reject a project using the simple majority
rule, that equally takes into account his/her decisions regarding the approval of a
project that correspond to its different components.6 The probability that a decision
maker reaches a correct decision for the project is zi = ( fm, p˜), where fm denotes
4 The homogeneity assumption has been very common in the literature on collective decision making in
uncertain dichotomous choice and it paved the way as a benchmark case to some of the main findings in
this literature.
5 Note that, although the decision-making skills are unknown, due to the homogeneity assumption, this
vector is equivalent to the skills vector of every decision maker.
6 If lack of knowledge concerning the private signals, i.e., the decision-making skills corresponding to the
various components of the project, is interpreted as meaning that individuals have no reason to believe that
their signal from one component is any better or any worse than their signal from another component, then
the simple majority internal aggregation rule is the plausible rule.
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the simple majority rule. Due to the assumption regarding the homogeneity of the
internal aggregation rules, z˜ = (( fm, p˜), ( fm, p˜), . . . ,( fm, p˜)).
Under the above decision rules, the comparison between the probability vectors q˜
and z˜ is equivocal, and therefore the question arises whether it is possible to deter-
mine whether specialization is preferable to non-specification or vice versa. Recall
that we assume that the same rule is applied by the committee under specialization
and non-specialization, which is a plausible assumption under lack of information
on decision-making skills. Our main finding is that specialization can be superior
to non-specialization despite its partial use of information. In the following theorem
we establish that, when the non-specializing committee member decides whether to
accept or reject a project on the basis of a single randomly selected component of
the project, which is certainly not an optimal internal aggregation rule, specialization
(non-specialization) becomes the superior mode of decision-making organization, pro-
vided that the probability of a correct collective decision under the aggregation rule
applied by the committee is monotonic and satisfies second-order positive (negative)
monotonicity.
Theorem 1 Suppose that zi = p¯ = 1m
∑m
j=1 p j . Then specialization is preferable
(not preferable) to non-specialization, provided that the probability of making the
correct decision under the aggregation rule applied by the committee is monotonic
and satisfies second-order positive monotonicity (negative monotonicity).
Proof 7 A function ( f, p˜) satisfies second-order positive monotonicity if,
∀p j < pi ,( f, p˜) − ( f, p˜/pi − ε) > ( f, p˜) − ( f, p˜/p j − ε)
Equivalently, we can write
∀p j < pi , ( f, p˜/p j − ε) > ( f, p˜/pi − ε)
As a special case for the above inequality take the probabilities vector ( p˜/pi + ε) and
find that
∀p j < pi , ( f, p˜/pi + ε, p j − ε) > ( f, p˜). (∗)
Successive application of (*) completes the proof, where at each step ε is chosen as
the smaller of the absolute differences between the mean p¯ and the maximum and
the minimum respectively, of the pi . After a finite number of steps, all the argu-
ments pi will have changed to p¯ and we have the result ( f, p˜) > ( f, ˜¯p), where˜¯p = ( p¯, p¯, . . . , p¯). We, therefore, obtain that ( f, q˜) > ( f, z˜). For a monotonic
function that satisfies second-order negative monotonicity, all the signs of the above
inequalities are reversed, hence, we have the result ( f, q˜) < ( f, z˜). unionsq
7 This proof is based on the same arguments used in Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000), where only the simple
majority rule was considered.
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Specialization is thus preferable to non-specialization, provided that the aggrega-
tion rule used by the committee is, for example, the simple majority rule. Moreover, if
the non-specializing committee members decide whether to accept or reject a project
on the basis of a single randomly selected component of the project, specialization is
preferable to non-specialization, if the committee applies an optimal aggregation rule
(the optimal rules under specialization and non-specialization may differ). That is,
Proposition 2 Suppose zi = p¯ = 1m
∑m
j=1 p j . Then specialization is preferable to
non-specialization, provided that the aggregation rules applied by the committee are
the optimal rules.
Proof Denote by f S and f NS the optimal aggregation rules under specialization
and non-specialization, respectively. In the case of non-specialization, the optimal
rule is the simple majority rule, hence f NS = fm, i.e., ( f NS, z˜) = ( fm, z˜).
By Theorem 1, specialization is preferable to non-specialization, provided that the
simple majority rule is used, hence, ( fm, q˜) > ( fm, z˜). When f S is the opti-
mal aggregation rule, ( f S, q˜) ≥ ( fm, q˜). Hence, ( f S, q˜) ≥ ( fm, z˜) =
( f NS, z˜). unionsq
Although the comparison between the probability vectors q˜ = (p1, p2, . . . , pn)
and z˜ = ( p¯, p¯, . . . , p¯) that are obtained, respectively, under specialization and our
first case of non-specialization, is equivocal, the low skills in q˜ are smaller than p¯
and the high skills in q˜ are larger than p¯. This is the reason why the comparison
between the performance of the (same) decision rule used by the committee under
specialization and under non-specialization hinges on the comparison between the
effect of the change in the low decision-making skills and the effect of the opposite
change in the high decision-making skills. Put differently, the outcome of the com-
parison between performance under specialization and non-specialization depends
on whether the monotonic probability of making the correct decision under the
rule used by the committee satisfies second-order positive or negative monotonicity.
Clearly, under second-order positive (negative) monotonicity, the effect of a change
in the higher (lower) decision-making skills is stronger than the effect of a change
in the lower (higher) decision-making skills. Therefore, under our first case of non-
specialization, and second-order positive (negative) monotonicity, specialization is
preferred (inferior) to non-specialization.
Under our second case of non-specialization, where fmis the internal aggregation
rule used by every non-specializing individual, the comparison between the proba-
bility vectors q˜ = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) and z˜ = (( fm, p˜),( fm, p˜), . . . ,( fm, p˜))
is again equivocal and, as in the first case, the low skills under specialization (the
low components in q˜) are smaller than the corresponding skills in z˜ (the identical
probability ( fm, p˜)). However, now the high skills in q˜ are not necessarily larger
than ( fm, p˜). That is, under non-specialization, all the decision-making skills may
increase and not just those of the less competent ones. This is the reason why when
the non-specializing committee members are assumed to resort to simple major-
ity rule when making the decision about the acceptability of the project, we can
only state a sufficient condition for the superiority of non-specialization. That is,
non-specialization is preferred to specialization under second-order negative
monotonicity.
123
354 R. Ben-Yashar et al.
Theorem 2 Suppose zi = ( fm, p˜). Then, non-specialization is preferable to spe-
cialization, provided that the probability of making the correct decision under the
aggregation rule applied by the committee is monotonic and satisfies second-order
negative monotonicity.
Proof By Theorem 1, when zi = p¯, non-specialization is preferable to specialization,
provided that the probability of making the correct decision is monotonic and satisfies
second-order negative monotonicity. Hence, ( f, z˜) ≥ ( f, q˜) where zi = p¯.
As shown in Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000), ( fm, p˜) ≥ p¯. By the monotonicity
of ( f, z˜), the replacement of zi = p¯ by zi = ( fm, p˜) increases ( f, z˜). Hence,
( f, z˜) ≥ ( f, q˜), where zi = ( fm, p˜). unionsq
Moreover, if the non-specializing committee members decide whether to accept
or reject a project using the simple majority rule, non-specialization is preferable to
specialization, provided that the committee also applies the simple majority rule. That
is, in such a case, zi = ( fm, q˜). According to Nitzan and Paroush (1982), given the
homogeneity of z˜,( fm, z˜) > zi . Hence, ( fm, q˜) > ( fm, q˜).
Our result that specialization can still be superior to non-specialization becomes
easier to establish in the following simple homogeneous case. Consider the situation of
decision makers possessing identical skills over the different components of the pro-
ject, where ∀ j 
= l, pi j = pil . That is, the decision-making skills of every individual
that correspond to the different components of the project are identical.
Let us denote by pi the homogenous skills of individual i . In this case, under spe-
cialization the skills used by the committee are given by q˜ = (pm, . . . , pm) where
pm is the maximum among all the individual pi s. In this case, one decision maker has
an advantage in every component.8 This implies that z˜ is not necessarily larger than
q˜ , despite the fact that every non-specializing individual decides optimally, i.e., he
bases his decision on the optimal internal aggregation rule. Even Proposition 1 is only
partly valid. That is, non-specialization is preferred to specialization, provided that
the rules applied by the non-specializing individuals and by the committee are opti-
mal.9 But if the committee applies the same aggregation rule (not the optimal) under
specialization and non-specialization, then the outcome of the comparison between
specialization and non-specialization is unclear, because q˜ ≥ z˜ is not necessarily
satisfied.10
8 Note that in the current setting the assumption that each decision maker is the expert in only one of the
project components is no longer valid.
9 Proof: Recall that q˜ = (pm , . . . , pm ). Since zm = ( fm, q˜) = ( f S, q˜),( f NS, z˜) ≥ ( f S, q˜),
where f S and f NS are the optimal aggregation rules under specialization and non-specialization, respec-
tively.
10 When the decision-making skills are unknown, it is meaningless to discuss the use of a non-optimal rule
by a non-specializing individual, because that individual is aware of the homogeneity of his own skills. This
awareness implies that he uses the simple majority rule which is the optimal rule. Furthermore, in such a
case it is unclear what is the skill vector under specialization, because skills are unknown.
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5 An illustrative example and brief summary
Consider a three-member committee, n = 3. Let the public project include three com-
ponents, m=3. The decision making skills of the committee members are presented in
the following matrix:
p =
⎛
⎝
0.9, 0.8, 0.7
0.9, 0.8, 0.7
0.9, 0.8, 0.7
⎞
⎠
Under specialization, the decision-making skills of the committee members are given
by q˜ = (0.9, 0.8, 0.7) .
Under non-specialization, the decision of every member is based on all three com-
ponents of the project.
Case 1: Every individual utilizes the optimal internal decision rule, which in this
case is the simple majority rule. This yields z˜ = (0.902, 0.902, 0.902) ≥
(0.9, 0.8, 0.7) = q˜ . Therefore, under any decision rule the committee is
better off under non-specialization (as implied by Proposition 1).
Case 2: Individual skills are given but are unknown. As a result, under non-special-
ization, an individual cannot apply the optimal internal decision rule. Under
the first option, where the individual chooses randomly the component on
which he bases his decision, we obtain that z˜ = (0.8, 0.8, 0.8) . If the com-
mittee applies the simple majority rule, which is monotonic and satisfied
second-order positive monotonicity, the collective probability of making a
correct choice will be equal to 0.896, which is lower than 0.902, the out-
come under specialization. If, however, the committee applies the hierarchy
rule, which is monotonic yet satisfies second-order negative monotonicity,
the collective probability of making a correct choice will be equal to 0.752,
which is higher than 0.749, the outcome under specialization, as implied by
Theorem 1.11
Case 3: Individual skills are given but are unknown. Again, every individual can-
not apply the optimal decision rule. Under the second option, he applies the
internal simple majority rule, which yields z˜ = (0.902, 0.902, 0.902) . If the
committee applies a simple majority rule, since z˜ > q˜ , its performance under
non-specialization is higher than its performance under specialization. If the
committee applies the hierarchy rule, then non-specialization is certainly
superior to specialization (0.8664>0.749), as implied by Theorem 2.
Notice that Theorems 1 and 2 are valid for homogeneous decision makers, as in the
above example. Under the general case of heterogeneous decision makers, the appli-
cation of specialization is not feasible without information on the highest decisional
skills for every component of the project (see footnote 5). Still, with such information
11 Under non-specialization and specialization, the collective probability of making a correct choice with
the hierarchy rule is equal, respectively, to 12 (0.8
3) + 12 (1 − 0.23) = 0.752 and 12 (0.9 · 0.8 · 0.7) +
1
2 (1 − 0.1 · 0.2 · 0.3) = 0.749.
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it is apparent that the result of the comparison between specialization and non-spe-
cialization is ambiguous depending on that information.
We have thus seen that the performance of the decision-making system is affected
by the role assigned to the decision-making units. There are situations where spe-
cialization is preferred to non-specialization and vice versa. Our preliminary results
already illustrate the significance of the role assigned to committee members in deter-
mining the performance of the collective decision-making system. Furthermore, these
results raise doubt regarding the validity of the advantage of committee decision mak-
ing relative to individual decision making, namely, the superiority of decision making
by many individuals relative to decision making by a single individual, as implied by
Condorcet Jury Theorem. Notice that, under the assumption of homogeneous skills,
specialization means that the collective judgment is based on the judgment of a single
individual and we have pointed out that, certainly, this might be superior to a collective
decision based on non-specialization.
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Appendix
Let us prove that ( fh, p˜) is monotonic and satisfies second-order negative mono-
tonicity. Under the symmetry assumption of the model, the priors of acceptance and
rejection of the project to be the correct choice are equal. Recall that under the hierar-
chy rule, to accept the project, unanimous support is required. Otherwise it is rejected.
Hence,
( fh, p˜) = 12 i∈N pi +
1
2
(1 − 
i∈N
(1 − pi ))
( fh, p˜) is monotonic since, ∀i,1≤i≤n,∀ε>0
( fh, p˜) − ( fh, p˜/pi − ε)
= 1
2 l∈N
pl +12
(
1 − 
l∈N
(1 − pl)
)
− 1
2
(pi − ε) 
l∈N ,l 
=i
pl −12
(
1 − (1 − (pi − ε)) 
l∈N ,l 
=i
(1 − pl)
)
= 1
2
ε 
l∈N ,l 
=i
pl +12ε l∈N ,l 
=i(1 − pl) > 0.
To prove the second-order negative monotonicity of ( fh, p˜), notice that
( fh, p˜) − ( fh, p˜/pi − ε) −
(
( fh, p˜) − ( fh, p˜/p j − ε)
)
= 1
2
ε
(

l∈N ,l 
=i
pl + 
l∈N ,l 
=i
(1 − pl)
)
− 1
2
ε
(

l∈N ,l 
= j
pl + 
l∈N ,l 
= j
(1 − pl)
)
= 1
2
ε
((

l 
=i,l 
= j
pl
)
(p j − pi ) +
(

l 
=i,l 
= j
(1 − pl)
)
(pi − p j )
)
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= 1
2
ε(p j − pi )
(

l 
=i,l 
= j
pl − 
l 
=i,l 
= j
(1 − pl)
)
< 0 ⇔ pi > p j
where ε is a positive number.
In a similar way it can be proved that ( fp, p˜) is monotonic and satisfies second-
order negative monotonicity.
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